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Session 6A
LAURI RECHARDT: Good morning, good afternoon, good evening,
wherever you might be logging in, and welcome to this session on Platform
Liability in the U.S. and the EU. My name is Lauri Rechardt, and when I'm not
moderating this session, I'm the chief legal officer of IFPI,1 the association
representing the recording industry worldwide, so full disclosure there. Why are
we discussing platform liability today? You might say that, rather surprisingly,
if you think of things a few years back, actually a lot has happened, and a lot is
happening in this area, not only with respect to copyright but with respect to
privacy, fake news, competition, harmful content, generally, you name it.
But let us stay in the particular area of copyright. In the U.S., the
Copyright Office published a report on section 512 safe harbors last year. 2 In
that report, which is of the usual high quality of the Copyright Office, the Office
was, I think it is fair to say, critical on the way the courts have interpreted the
safe harbors. Subsequently, the Office made recommendations, how to restore
the balance that the legislature had originally intended to strike. As a follow-up
to that report, there's been a series of hearings and roundtables in Congress, and
Senator Tillis published a draft bill to reform section 512.3
In the EU, as we heard already yesterday, there are a couple of very
important cases pending before the Court of Justice, the joined
YouTube/Uploaded cases4 and the “Polish challenge”5 to Article 17 of the DSM
Directive.6 These decisions may well shape copyright or the copyright liability
of online platforms in Europe, both with regards to the scope of and conditions
for the safe harbors, and as to the type of liability that the platforms may be
subject to in Europe. In addition to that, in Europe, we have the alphabet soup,
or the D suite. We have Article 17 of the DSM Directive, which was adopted in
2019, and we have the Commission's proposals on the DSA7 and DMA,8 the
Digital Services and the Digital Markets Act. They all address to a greater or
lesser degree, the issue of platform liability in Europe. The DSM, as we are all
aware, addresses in a very narrow manner the liability of certain online content
sharing services. The DSA addresses online intermediaries’ liabilities in a
horizontal manner with respect to all kinds of content, not only copyright. Just
for the record, we will discuss today EU and U.S. developments, but it is
1
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important to note that these issues are actually looked at around the world. We
are seeing developments in India, in Australia, with respect to publishers' rights
in particular, in Mexico, you name it.
These ongoing developments beg the question, what is driving these
discussions and developments? I think it's fair to say that we are seeing that the
policymakers are waking up to the need to re-assess generally the policy pivot—
that has prevailed during the past 20 to 25 years—in favor of tech and online
companies that has enabled them to grow and prosper. Part of that reassessment
is, as we heard clearly from Marco Giorello from the European Commission, an
assessment of the balance between the different fundamental rights at play, the
protection of copyright in our case, and the freedom of expression and freedom
to conduct business.
There are differing views as to where that balance should lie, or whether
indeed we have we lost the balance? Or if we have lost the balance which way
has the balanced dipped? It may be difficult to get to an agreement on these
points, differences run deep and are sometimes ideological rather than based on
practical considerations, but naively I still believe that a reasonable sweet spot
can be found. My idea of the sweet spot is regulation that protects right holders’
legitimate interests while also protecting genuine freedom of expression, which
is something we all care deeply about, without allowing it to be used as a pretext
to appropriate and monetize other people's expressions. Such a solution should
enable online platforms to develop and thrive to the benefit of us all, but at the
same time they aren't allowed to use and monetize copyright content, without
negotiating licenses first.
We have a great lineup of speakers and panelists today to discuss these
issues. As speakers we have Maria Strong, first of all, from the Copyright
Office. We have Abby Rives from Engine to give another point of view. We
have Ursula Feindor-Schmidt, from Lausen Rechtsanwälte, which I think stands
for attorneys of law. And we have Stan McCoy, Motion Picture Association,
Europe, Middle East, and Africa. As panelists, we have Sandra Aistars from the
Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property at Antonin Scalia Law School
at George Mason University. Last but definitely not least, Julia Reda from
Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. Maria,
first over to you and a summary on the Copyright Office report and what is
going to happen.
MARIA STRONG: Thanks so much, Lauri, and thanks to Hugh and the
whole team for inviting me. I have, in my seven minutes, five points to talk
about in the Copyright Office's report that we issued last year and what's been
happening since.
My first issue is the report itself. After years of public input analysis, on
May 21st of last year, we issued the first ever comprehensive public report by a
U.S. government agency on the operation of section 512.9
When Congress enacted 512 in 1998, it hoped to balance two objectives:
content owners needed effective enforcement so that they could safely make
their work in a digital environment with low barriers to infringement, and online
service providers needed to have thoroughly defined limits around their liability
for their users’ actions so that they could continue to develop services without
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the fear of crippling liability. What we concluded is that the operation of the
section 512 safe harbor system today has become unbalanced.
While OSPs still have the legal certainty they seek, rightsholders'
abilities to enforce their copyrights is now less effective than what Congress
intended. The report noted that if Congress chose to continue the same balance
that it had established in the DMCA and move forward on all the issues that we
identified in our report, then our Office harbors some optimism that a path
forward for restoring that 512 balance could be found.
In prior speeches and meetings, some of you may have heard me
compare the DMCA 512 issues to a 3D ball full of different groups of
rightsholders and ISPs,10 users and policy makers, all with different views, all
with different problems, moving through time and going in multiple directions.
Given these diverse and complex issues, we identified some guiding principles
that we used as we examined the numerous issues related to the operation of
512. This is a slide that identifies some of the many issues that we identified in
our report.
While the Office did not recommend any wholesale changes to 512, we
pointed out several areas where Congress may wish to improve 512’s current
operation in order to better balance the rights and responsibilities of OSPs11 and
rights holders in the creative industries. We also identified non-statutory areas
of untapped potential that could increase the effectiveness of 512.
Also notable is what we did not recommend. For example, we did not
recommend adopting notice and stay down at this time. We're watching to see
what's happening in Europe, and as well as what might be happening in
Congress because we think that if Congress does go that route, they're going to
have to look at what are the balancing factors that they want in the system. We
also did not recommend website blocking. The SOPA12 and PIPA13 memories
live on, and even though dozens of other countries are issuing a type of
injunctive relief, any movement on this issue would require congressional
direction, and as of now, there seems to be little appetite for that.
Public reaction to our report, as with the case in many of our reports,
was mixed. Generally speaking, tech and user communities were relieved that
we did not propose throwing out notice and takedown, and that we did not
support notice and stay down. Rightsholders were relieved that we saw that the
current operation of notice and takedown was not reflecting the balance that
Congress intended. Much like the entire debate on 512, the reactions were
complex, nuanced, and they should not be seen as black and white, either or
polar opposites.
We were also mindful of the opportunities and challenges faced by
everyone in an online environment, large and small, medium, creators, OSPs,
users—that's all very different today than it was in 1998. Congress could choose
to re-evaluate how it structures any balancing factors in the current
environment, and it could also consider other measures that would go beyond
the current constructs of 512. We noted that these kinds of legislative decisions
are in the hands of Congress and the Office made no recommendations with
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respect to those larger questions about balancing, which brings me to my second
point.
Last year, two senators, Senator Tillis and Senator Leahy, then the Chair
and Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary IP Subcommittee, quickly took us
up on our offer and our questions that we posed to the Congress. They asked us
to get back to them within thirty days with the answers to a series of some
complex questions, some of which appear on this slide. We responded back on
time, and we identified five issues in the section 512 that we thought would
benefit from congressional action.
To be clear, we explicitly noted that our one-size-does-not-fit-all
guidance should be considered in at least three areas: the repeat infringer policy,
improving the notice and takedown process, and redressing a problem with both
a too long or too short timeframe for counter notices. We also provided several
outlines and numerous policy guidance and questions that would need to be
answered if legislators were to consider a start-from-scratch solution.
This brings my third point, which covers non-statutory actions, and
Lauri mentioned some of them that the Copyright Office initiated after we
issued our report.
First, we improved our public education resources. We built a new
webpage portal that is dedicated to all aspects of the DMCA. Second, we also
provided detailed information on what should be in notices and counter-notices.
We developed FAQs, from the views of an OSP, a rightsholder, and a user who
uses public websites. Third, we also held three public sessions last September
on the issue of Standard Technical Measures. As we noted in our report, STMs
depend on voluntary cooperation, collaboration in consultation with and across
various industry sectors. Recall having a repeat infringer policy and adhering to
STMs are actually conditions of eligibility for OSPs under 512.
Many, not all, stakeholders noted that no measures currently qualify for
STM despite the availability of various technologies and potential interest
across various industry sectors. We are still reviewing what our next steps might
be on STMs. Also, it's important to note, last October, our new Register of
Copyrights, Shira Perlmutter, joined the office; she has definite hands-on
experience with the DMCA as she was with the Office when it was passed.
My fourth point is a quick summary of the congressional action taken
by Congress last year. As Lauri mentioned, the Senate IP Subcommittee has
held seven hearings on DMCA issues. But it's important to note that DMCA has
actually been on the Senate radar since at least 2019, so they're moving forward
and showing their interest last year and continuing this year is not really that
much of a surprise. There also have been numerous stakeholder meetings with
congressional committees over the last year. Last December, Senator Tillis
issued a 53-page discussion draft, called The Digital Copyright Act Discussion
Draft. He proposed a wide variety of proposals; there are a lot of elements in
here. It was intentional on his part to go big. Basically, I think he used word “to
throw a bomb” of ideas out there so that he could get stakeholder interest and
discussions going. He asked for public comments by March 5th, and he has
stated publicly he intends to work toward release a bipartisan, bicameral
proposal in April or May. He's hopeful also that voluntary cooperation route is
going to happen, but if that doesn't, he's willing to use legislation.
My last point is the what's next. As many of you know, the political
powers have shifted in our Senate. Earlier this year, Senator Tillis is now a
5
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Ranking Member. Everyone's looking to see what new Chairman Patrick Leahy,
who's no stranger to copyright and IP, is going to be doing in this timeframe, at
least at the subcommittee level. Various senators, including Tillis and Leahy,
have been sending a number of letters to various players in the internet
ecosystem, so they are definitely active right now in getting some information.
To sum up, we're still dealing with that swirling three-dimensional
multiverse of copyright liability issues here, but it's fair to say I think a much
brighter spotlight is going to be shining on 512 and online platform liability. I
can't predict what 2021 will bring, but I do suspect that the conversations in both
the voluntary and the legislative space will increase. With that, I thank you.
Happy to take questions forward.
LAURI RECHARDT: Thanks, Maria. That’s a really brilliant
presentation. I would like to bring now the discussion to our panelists. Julia, if
you go first, quick reaction. Maria, I hope you don't mind me paraphrasing, but
I think it's fair to say that the Copyright Office thought that the courts had not
really gotten the DMCA safe harbor right, and therefore, you had to intervene
and try to restore the balance. Did the courts get it wrong?
MARIA STRONG: Yes. I think it’s right. As an agency in the legislative
branch, we want to respect our co-equals in the other branches, so I don't want
to make it personal and say courts got it wrong. But we definitely identified
numerous areas where we are concerned that some of the court decisions
stepped away from the balance that Congress provided in the legislation and as
time has gone by, that's the issue that's being challenged both by technological
change.
I think everyone would agree that the DMCA is a great success story in
the sense that legitimate content owners have far more opportunities to create
and distribute their products. The OSPs have also similarly grown and have
more products. Users are now a much more active part of the system in terms
of both of their voice at the political table as well as, as we've seen in the
pandemic, the need for their engagement. I think we raised some very specific
issues on the role of especially 512(a)14 conduits providers and what an
overbroad remote disabling access remedy would do to the internet ecosystem
including free speech rights.
LAURI RECHARDT: Julia, Sandra, quick reactions.
JULIA REDA: Thank you. I think, first of all, taking the wait-and-see
approach regarding the reforms that are underway in Europe is certainly a good
idea because we're really seeing that what the European legislature has
envisioned is not really possible. Basically saying there should be notice and
stay down without the blocking of legal content, so I'm glad to hear that notice
and stay down is not on the agenda for the Copyright Office. I don't think the
technology exists to satisfy both of those conditions to remove illegal content
and leave legal content online. What I would also perhaps like to highlight or
ask about is the question of transparency over copyright notices.
At the Berkman Klein Center, there has been a long commitment to
cataloging notices in the Lumen Database and this has enabled a lot of very
important research about possible abuses of the system. There have been very
important investigative journalistic projects such as The Wall Street Journal
investigation into so-called reputation management companies that use notice
14
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and takedown as a means of removing perfectly legal content from the
internet.15 My question would be whether there are ideas to make this reporting
and publishing of notices mandatory to enable more research and more
regulatory oversight over possible abuses of the system.
MARIA STRONG: Thanks, Julia, for your questions. Yes, the
Copyright Office is always a big fan of transparency, and in order to address
some of the changes in what's being required by ISPs with respect to both
notices and counter-notices, that is part of the reason why we developed the
website we did to provide better information for the public to use. To your
question about the data, in our notice of inquiry, hearings, and public sessions,
we ask for public data. We ask for evidence. The challenge we have in this space
is that notice and takedown is not supervised by a government agency. It is an
extrajudicial remedy, so we do not have the data for which to inform decisions.
Despite our asking for it, I would say the availability of data fell far
short. I am not in a place to say to your subject, to your question, as to whether
the Copyright Office at the time is going to mandate data, under the current
system; we can't. We are an agency who, by the very definition of the balance
struck in the DMCA, where the co-operation is between the rightsholders and
ISPs. The government is not involved. To the extent those are ideas you might
be posing, obviously, that is possibly a discussion point that will be happening
on Capitol Hill either through the voluntary discussions that might be happening
going forward or any legislative forum. Thank you for the question.
LAURI RECHARDT: Sandra, Julia thinks that we shouldn't go down
the route of stay down. What is your take on that?
SANDRA AISTARS: Thank you for the question. I think one of the
topics that received the most interest in the 512 study was, in fact, notice and
stay down, and that has been true over the years. In part, that is because the
courts have, in fact, done a poor job in interpreting the notice standards in
section 512 and that there's been a breakdown in interpreting the so-called red
flags notice standard and the courts have collapsed the red flags notice standard
into what is required under notice and takedown. The entire statute has become
a notice and takedown section effectively. There are basically no requirements
on service providers to do anything other than respond to notices that the
copyright owners send.
There's this endless battle of sending notices and responding to notices,
and then the work goes right back up. That is what all of these discussions have
been about over the years. I think it is very important to find some way of getting
us out of that for sure. Whether it's what the EU is doing or something different,
I don't know. We'll see what comes out of the EU, but I think it's definitely
worth looking at and evaluating. The other thing that I think is important to do
is you need to look at the meaning of red flag knowledge. It is very curious to
me that we can have court decisions that have gone all the way to basically say
it's okay for employees to refer to works that appear on websites that they are
managing as illegal or stolen and okay for them to look at full-length copies of
works on their websites that are currently popular in theaters and not have that
trigger red flag knowledge.
15
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I think we do need to do something to restore the meaning of red flag
knowledge. That might help us in finding a balance with the notice and
takedown approach. I think the other thing that would help is revisiting some of
the concepts that exist in the DMCA but have gotten very little attention over
the years. Maria mentioned one which is this concept that standard technical
measures which companies, service providers would be required to implement
as they are identified.
I think that's a very promising road to explore. The other is this concept
of responding to representative lists of infringing works. I think if we can look
at the whole of what the DMCA was supposed to be when it was enacted and
try to get back to the entire package, that might remove focus from just one part
of the statute as being what will fix the entirety of what's gone wrong over the
past now 23 years, I guess. Thanks.
LAURI RECHARDT: Thanks. Yes, look, I think we will get back to
both the question of red flag knowledge, which obviously in Europe, under the
E-Commerce Directive16 is equally very much an issue, as well as the stay down
which some might argue that actually is already a requirement under the EU law
following the European Court of Justice decision in L’Oréal,17 but let's get back
to those issues later. I would now hand over to Abby to give us the views from
the start-up community.
ABIGAIL RIVES: Thank you very much, and thanks to the organizers
for the invitation to join today. As noted, I'm IP counsel at Engine Advocacy.
We're a non-profit that bridges the gap between policymakers and thousands of
start-ups across the U.S. through research, policy analysis, and advocacy. This
morning, I hope I can offer some perspectives on how section 512 of the
Copyright Act works for start-ups and flag some realities that we hope will not
be lost in policy discussions over copyright liability. 18
At the outset, I do want to note I think especially in policy conversations,
both the framing and the scope of who is invited to participate is extremely
important because otherwise, we risk laws that hurt innovation, creativity, free
expression, and economic growth. To the extent rhetoric over section 512 policy
can sometimes set up a false dichotomy of tech stakeholders versus copyright
stakeholders – I find that framing can not only be frustrating and inaccurate but
can miss critical nuance and obscure the interests of users and internet-enabled
creators.
I very much appreciate Maria's characterization of the diversity and the
complexity of the issues at stake in these conversations. To add a little bit more
color to what I think Maria already alluded to, we've seen, for example,
technology has really democratized creativity, among other things. Internet
platforms, including scores of smaller ones, have created entirely new ways for
users and creators to reach fans and customers. In 2017 alone, nearly 17 million
Americans earned a collective $6.8 billion by sharing their personal creations
on just 9 internet platforms. 19 Another indication of the importance of the
16
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conversations we're having today is, I think, exemplified by the fact that we're
all gathering, working, educating, shopping, and right now at this very moment,
attending a conference remotely. We're more reliant than ever on technology
that would not exist but for section 512.
Turning to 512 itself, when Congress passed the DMCA, it of course
knew that OSPs would need legal certainty, certainty that they would not be
automatically liable when their users were accused of infringement. 20 To meet
that need, Congress set up the notice and takedown and safe harbor frameworks
and all OSPs, and that includes founders that are looking to launch new social
media sites and bloggers that allow readers to submit comments on a post, these
folks and everyone else has a pretty clear path to follow to avoid liability for
things that their users do.
In order to launch, grow, and compete, today's start-ups need the same
certainty and protections afforded to their predecessors. Why does this still
matter so much for start-ups? First, 512 allows start-ups to comply with the law
without having to hire a bunch of lawyers and moderators or purchase expensive
yet imperfect upload filters. In fact, for a number of the companies Engine
works with, it is the founder or one of the first very few employees that receives
takedown notices or checks the mailbox where they are sent.
Second, the avoidance of liability is especially important for tech startups. It can cost $0.5 million just to get to summary judgment in an intermediary
liability case,21 and that sum is an awful lot of money for most start-ups.22 The
mere fact or threat of litigation can pose substantial barriers to start-up entry.
We've seen meritless IP litigation put some young tech companies out of
business or impose severe operational impacts like causing a substantial drop in
the start-up's valuation.23
Also, even with the certainty of 512, DMCA cases can drag on for
decades. They can cost millions of dollars. In one example, DMCA litigation
was enough to force a video streaming start-up towards bankruptcy even though
it was in compliance with the safe harbor requirements.24 Relatedly, investors
content/uploads/2019/02/ReCreate-2017-New-Creative-Economy-Study.pdf (reporting
earnings for U.S. creators from these platforms: Amazon Publishing, eBay, Etsy, Instagram,
Shapeways, Tumblr, Twitch, WordPress, and YouTube).
20
See, e.g., S. REP. 105-190, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (May
11, 1998) (Congress sought to “provide[] greater certainty to service providers concerning
their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their activities”).
21
Evan Engstrom, Primer: Value of Section 230, ENGINE (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.engine.is/news/primer/section230costs.
22
For (the minority) of startups that obtain VC or angel and seed-stage equity
financing, the average seed-stage startup raises a total of $1.2 million, and that is expected to
cover all of its costs for nearly two years. The State of the Startup Ecosystem, ENGINE (2021),
https://engineis.squarespace.com/s/The-State-of-the-Startup-Ecosystem.pdf.
23
See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C.L. REV. 1571, 1587-88 (2009)
(describing strategic use of patent litigation to threaten a competitor business’s survival); Ted
Sichelma; The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in “Patent Bullying,” 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
543, 575 (2014) (describing IP litigation that put startup “at the brink of insolvency,” and hurt
its value); Amy L. Landers, The Antipatent: A Proposal for Startup Immunity, 93 NEB. L.
REV. 950, 979-80 (2015) (recounting examples of two former startups who won patent cases
but lost market opportunities).
24
Emily Chasan, Web Video Service Veoh to Liquidate, Founder Says, REUTERS
(Feb. 12, 2010), https://www.reuters.com/article/veoh-bankruptcy-idCNN1216366120100212
(quoting founder saying “[t]he distraction of the legal battles, and the challenges of the
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don't want to spend on legal fees, and so shifting more liability or just expecting
start-ups to cover more legal fees could drive away investment. 25
Third, in the U.S. at least, the magnitude of statutory damages really
amplifies these concerns since plaintiffs can seek up to $150,000 per work
infringed.26 That can really add up very quickly. There's one case where a
plaintiff sought statutory damages from an OSP amounting to more money than
the entire recording industry had made since the invention of the phonograph. 27
While that extraordinary ask may be an anomaly, I think it does help show how
copyright damages can really quickly multiply to something no startup could
ever afford.
Fourth, another important factor to keep in mind is that most OSPs see
very little actual infringement or even allegations of infringement. If we're
forcing every OSP, including much smaller or early-stage companies, to police
all content, we wouldn't catch much if any additional infringement while it
would come with substantial drawback and expense.
Finally, changing the DMCA, even in ways that might seem minor,
could shift the ground underneath today's startups. While established
incumbents already automate many aspects of their infringement monitoring
and have the resources to absorb increase legal risks, startups do not.
Turning to some of the policy proposals and hearkening back to what
Maria has already mentioned, there are a number of proposed changes to 512
that are percolating, and for now, I can offer thoughts on just a few, but I'm
happy to discuss further, of course. First, on the topic of imposing an affirmative
duty to monitor, this would be seriously detrimental for startups, whether that
comes through a filtering mandate, notice and stay down or adjusting certain
thresholds in the law, these types of changes would create new costs and risks
that startups would seriously struggle with.
We know filters have inherent limitations.28 Existing tools have high
error rates. For many types of content, there are no filters. And technology is
fundamentally incapable of addressing certain fact-specific questions of
infringement like fair use and licensing. Importantly, these filters are also out
of reach for most startups. Developing them costs orders of magnitude more
broader macro-economic climate have lead to our Chapter 7 bankruptcy.”). Veoh launched in
2005 and was sued by Universal Music Group in 2007. That case was not resolved until 2013.
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). UMG
eventually lost the suit, with the Ninth Circuit affirming that Veoh was operating within the
protection of DMCA safe harbors. But while the suit was pending, Veoh filed for bankruptcy.
See also, e.g., Joseph Parish, Universal Loses DMCA Lawsuit Against Veoh, The Verge (Dec.
22, 2011), https://www.theverge.com/2011/12/22/2652889/universal-dmca-lawsuit-veohaffirmed (covering Veoh’s first Ninth Circuit victory and bankruptcy); Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (in another case filed by adult film
producer, court held that Veoh met its burden of proving its entitlement to the safe harbor).
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than what a startup could afford, 29 and licensing and maintaining the off-theshelf filters is similarly out of reach for most startups.30
Likewise, assessing safe harbor eligibility based on whether an OSP's
moderation practices are reasonable is also fraught from a startup perspective.
Reasonableness is a fact-specific inquiry, it is intentionally flexible, meaning
especially for a tech company that's looking to grow quickly what was
reasonable one month might not be reasonable the next. Companies would be
in a position of having to relitigate reasonableness as often as they were accused
of infringement and as such, a safe harbor would have little practical value.
Before I wrap, I did want to make a very brief note about improper
takedowns because while 512 has been successful in many ways it is well
documented that notice-senders can misuse 512 to hurt competition or remove
content that they just don't like. For users who receive those bad faith notices,
while they can dispute them--for example, an Etsy seller who loses two weeks
of sales during the holiday season due to an improper notice--those strikes can
be devastating.31 While notice and take down does largely work well overall, it
is subject to substantial abuse and in thinking about any potential changes, it's
really important to avoid making the problems worse.
Overall, at a time when there is a lot of attention around this and related
areas of the law, we hope that as policy makers continue to think about the
DMCA, startups, smaller tech companies and the users and internet creators that
depend on them will have a seat at the table. Thanks.
LAURI RECHARDT: Thank you, that was a very clear message. I have
a quick question to you. Do you think that startups should have different liability
regime from the rest of the industry, rest of, if you will, of the world?
ABIGAIL RIVES: I am first very sorry, you froze up right in the middle
of that question, but I'm pretty sure that I know what you’re asking because we
spoke about it during the prep for today's session, on the idea of having a law
for big companies and a law for small companies. Is that the question?
LAURI RECHARDT: Yes.
ABIGAIL RIVES: Okay. I very much appreciate that question and that
perspective, and I think it's really essential to keep in mind. When those
questions come up in the abstract in conversations that we have, there are three
red flags that pop up for us because there's inherently a line-drawing exercise,
what's a big company and what's a small company? Where you draw the line
and how you draw the line is really important, as is what happens when you
cross the line – and what is the experience of going across that threshold going
to be like for a small company. If you don't answer those questions correctly, it
can defeat the purpose of giving small companies the benefit of a different legal
regime.
See, e.g., Paul Sawers, YouTube: We’ve Invested $100 Million in Content ID and
Paid Over $3 Billion to Rightsholders, VENTUREBET (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://venturebeat.com/2018/11/07/youtube-weve-invested-100-million-in-content-id-andpaid-over-3-billion-to-rig htsholders/ (YouTube spent over $100 million to develop
ContentID).
30
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(2017) (reporting how Audible Magic licenses can cost upwards of $10,000 per month and
require companies to spend more to implement and maintain the software).
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Relatedly, the line-drawing exercise itself can give rise to some
concerns. At least in the U.S., we've seen this in areas of the law that do similar
line-drawing. It can be very expensive to litigate and prove that you are a small
company under the law. The type of line that is drawn and how clear and
predictable that is, that is also very important.
The third point, I think, is, sometimes, when these conversations come
up it's my sense that there's a bad policy proposal on the table. In order to solve
that problem, it's like, "Well, we'll just carve out all the companies that we like
so that they don't have to do this thing that's probably a bad idea in a vacuum."
If that's what's going on, then I think it's really important to just be very critical
of the policy proposal because there are probably other unintended
consequences – for companies that would meet the definition of a large
company, for users, for some of the creators that rely on these platforms.
I appreciate the question. I think that for policy makers, I hope they'll
continue to have that thinking in their mindset, but the devil will be in the
details.
LAURI RECHARDT: There is a question to you on the Q&A, I don't
know if you can just read it. Essentially, it makes the point that a lot of creators
are small businesses, SMEs,32 or even microbusinesses like a startup, and the
question is, do you think that Article 17, I don’t know if you're familiar with the
Article 17 on the DSM Directive, strikes the right balance.
ABIGAIL RIVES: I will first note while Engine as an organization has
been involved in conversations around Article 17, I, personally, have been less
involved. I'm not sure that this is really going to answer the question, but Article
17 does have a carve-out for smaller service providers.33 We have a concern that
the line there has just been drawn much too low – a company would have to be
less than three years old and have a relatively small number of users to meet
Article 17’s definition. We're really only talking about adjusting Article 17’s
basic framework for the smallest of companies. Under the definition of larger
companies are still relatively young or small companies like Patreon, like Etsy,
and the same rules that apply to the largest platforms in the world would apply
equally to them. I think that there's a concern that the line drawing in Article 17
may have missed the mark.
LAURI RECHARDT: Stan, do you want to say anything about that?
You look like you wanted to say something. I thought you did. No? Okay. Fine.
There is also, I think, a question to Maria. If you don't mind, let's save that to
the last in the general discussion. If there are no more questions to Abby, or
comments, then why don't we move on to Ursula. You're going to discuss the
DSM Article 17 and maybe also comment a little on the pending ECJ issues,
the Uploaded/YouTube case.
URSULA FEINDOR-SCHMIDT: Yes, thank you. I think you should
see the slides now. Is that okay?
LAURI RECHARDT: Yes, it's good.
URSULA FEINDOR-SCHMIDT: Regarding the liability of platforms,
we are about to witness some fundamental changes in Europe resulting from
32
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two parallel developments that have been discussed a lot amongst this audience
here, and followed, of course, closely by rightsholders, platforms and users of
the internet. The development will climax this year in 2021. Certainly, the
Youtube and Uploaded case34 will be decided, of course, by the European Court
of Justice and the implementation of Article 17 of Copyright Directive 2019 by
the Member States will be due until June 7th.
Now, both things I will be speaking on were expected to be clear by the
time this conference was taking place. Both are actually not clear nor detailed,
but we can certainly discuss where things are heading and what this means in
practice.
In any event, from my perspective, there will be three main conceptual
changes to general principles in copyright we will be facing from 2021 in
Europe. There will be new ex-ante obligations platforms will have to comply
with before infringements occur. Second, rightsholders, likewise, might have to
take action before infringements occur in order to make use of the new law.
Thirdly, a third party is reemphasized in the process, it's the users of platforms
which are given a greater voice when it comes to the limits and exceptions of
exclusive rights granted by copyright.
Let me explain those changes in more detail. Firstly, the new ex-ante
obligation for platforms. So far, content sharing platforms generally rely on the
argument that they are not themselves making the content available, and that,
likewise with the DMCA, according to Article 14 E-Commerce Directive, 35
they do not have to do more than comply with legal takedown requests when it
comes to copyright infringements by their users.
The European Court of Justice will now decide in due course whether a
platform operator which is setting up a system, which in many respects
incentivizes uploads for attractive original content, and which thereby as a
consequence leads to millions of infringements for the commercial gain of the
central organizing platform can be held directly liable for the infringement
occurring without the possibility of Article 14 E-Commerce Directive.
If the Court follows its broader course of the past like in the Filmspeler 36
or the Pirate Bay decision,37 it might come to the conclusion that platforms like
YouTube and Uploaded are actually communicating to the public themselves,
assuming knowledge if massive amounts of copyrighted content are
commercialized. If the Court is following the more formalistic approach
Advocate General Øe has provided in his opinion on the case in July 2020, it
might come to the conclusion that communication to the public is depending on
the technical process of the upload alone and on actual knowledge of the specific
piece of content.38
34
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In this case, the platform, however, might still be liable as an
accomplice, but the conditions for this would actually be depending on national
law of the respective Member State as this is not harmonized. The decision will
certainly shape the basis of the general liability of platforms in the future.
Despite the outcome of the decision, the 2019 Copyright Directive provides a
lex specialis for online content sharing service providers.
It clarifies that those platforms actually are communicating to the public
and that they do not qualify for the safe harbor in Article 14 E-Commerce
Directive, independent from any degree of knowledge. For those platforms, the
legislator is providing for the possibility to escape liability if those platforms
follow a very specific process. This process now is imposing conceptionally
new ex-ante obligations on those platforms.
To comply with the process in practice, the platforms will actually have
to identify the content access is provided to, they will have to identify the
rightsholders, they will have to approach rightsholders in order to obtain
licenses, they will have to block content rightsholders have provided
information to, and they will have to set up a complaint and redress mechanism
for users and rightsholders.
This, however, comes at a price for rightsholders. As a general concept
of copyright laid down already in Article 5 Berne Convention,39 is that the
rightsholder neither has to register its rights, nor have they to monitor the market
for unlicensed users. Actually, the user has to approach the rightsholder and ask
for permission. For online content sharing services, the new law changes this
concept to a certain extent. Therefore, there will also be actions that have to be
taken by the rightsholders in order to be able to license or stop unlicensed usage
of content on platforms.
The rightsholders have to identify platforms which fall under Article
17.40 They have to identify their own content on those platforms, they have to
decide whether to license or to block, they have to define their own licensing
structures, they have to evaluate industry standards for relevant necessary
information, and they have to establish a process for the complaint and redress
mechanism.
Thirdly, the battlefield is no longer shared by two parties alone, but a
third party is reemphasized by the new law as it has already been mentioned in
TRIPS41 and INFOSOC,42 as well as by the jurisprudence in a couple of
landmark decisions like the UPC Telekabel43 or the Pelham case.44 Also,
Advocate General Øe is taking into account to balance exclusive rights with
fundamental rights in the YouTube and Uploaded opinion.
39
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The cooperation between platforms and rightsholders will therefore
have to actively safeguard exceptions of limitations for the copyright in favor
of the users, which thereby might evolve into actual and enforceable rights
positions. Those new positions will require to establish a completely new
process with a complex back and forth communication between internet users,
platform, and rightsholders.
You might have seen the upload machine the German legislature has
set up. We will see what this does to all the parties involved. The process
likely will mostly only be handled and financed by the biggest parties in the
market and will create problems for small platforms which will be
disburdened for a while, as we just heard, but will certainly not be able to
reach the status of the current market leaders, which grew without such
burden. This will be creating problems for the competition, of course. It will
certainly also discriminate against smaller rightsholders which might not have
the means to implement the technology required and which will force them
into collective licensing by collecting societies, taking away control over their
works. Thank you.
LAURI RECHARDT: Thank you. That was spot-on time, Ursula,
thanks for that. I would have a question for you. My problem with the German
implementation proposal is that it doesn't seem to be in line with the DSM
Copyright Directive. What is your view, it seems that in many respects the
German implementation draft45 doesn't comply with Article 17(4), the so-called
mitigation measures, and it also effectively creates new exceptions, which also
don’t align with European Copyright law? So, how do you square that circle?
URSULA FEINDOR-SCHMIDT: I think it actually is squaring the
circle. I think what the German Implementation Act tries to do is to already put
in some of the balance the Directive is asking for. There is a balance required
between users, rightsholders, and platforms, and there is a balance required for
smaller platforms. There's also a balance required between the rightsholders and
the platforms in terms of, this pulls them back. Now what the German legislation
is trying to do is put some flesh into the gaps that the Directive left.
I wouldn't see it clearly so far that this is overstepping the boundaries,
but it's certainly hitting the boundaries the Directive is setting. It will only be
clear with the future litigation, which is certainly coming, on how the courts
interpret, and whether they interpret the German law in accordance with the
Directive and don't put it too strictly. Because, otherwise, I really see that there
would be a problem.
LAURI RECHARDT: Maria, if the German implementation may be
encroaching, if you will, the international copyright rules, do you see that the
U.S. will take action? Has there been any analysis on that in the Copyright
Office?
MARIA STRONG: Thanks, Lauri. When it comes to the international
sphere, we're part of the broader inter-agency process. As IP is often tied in with
trade, we coordinate and work with our colleagues, for example, the U.S. trade
representative, the IP attachés in the region. Yes, I can say that the U.S.
government inter-agency is keenly aware of what's happening in Germany as
well as all the other Member States at various stages of their consideration. In
45

Regierungsentwurf [Cabinet Draft], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT]
19/27426, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/274/1927426.pdf (Ger.).

15

Session 6A
terms of engagement, it's probably more country to country right now. This is
not a TRIPS case or anything like that. This is not that jurisdiction, but it is a
bilateral concern.
I will say right now, the new Biden administration is still onboarding
some of its staff and senior leaders. For example, we would expect and look
forward to the inputs of the new PTO director once that person is nominated as
well as the IP coordinator in order to come up with a whole of government
approach in order to engage our counterparts on the concerns.
Because we realize that the internet ecosystem is international. At the
same time, we have our interests to represent American commerce companies
who are, obviously, involved in global distribution, all to say, yes, the U.S.
government inter-agency is watching.
LAURI RECHARDT: Julia, any comments, any views? One of the
issues that has been discussed is the impact of different implementations across
EU Member States. I seem to recall that the idea with the Digital Single Market
Directive46 was to create a single digital market, but now it seems that we're
heading in exactly the opposite direction. How do you see that?
JULIA REDA: Yes. I think the reason for that is because the European
legislature failed to answer the really difficult questions. How can you make all
the illegal content be taken down automatically while leaving all the legal
content online? The Directive simply says that this should be the result. The
German implementation is trying to put this contradictory requirement into
action, albeit, imperfectly, I think it's perhaps the closest to the guidance that
the European Commission has so far issued which is really focused on the
realization that there have to be measures to prevent legal content from being
blocked in the first place.
As was mentioned, the European Court of Justice is currently
deliberating over whether Article 17 of the Copyright Directive47 is compliant
with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The most hotly debated question at the
public hearing in this court case was whether Article 17 ensures that legal
content actually stays online. All the European institutions have argued that it
does so because the requirement to keep legal content online is a requirement
of result, or an obligation of result, whereas the requirement to block content is
just a requirement of best effort.
If it's not possible to reach both of those goals at the same time, then the
requirement not to block legal content is the more important one, because,
otherwise, you would have a situation of prior restraint. You would have a law
that would oblige platforms to delete perfectly legal content which cannot be
done. I find it strange, though, to question the international compatibility of that,
because, frankly, platforms will be more liable than they were before, even
under the German implementation.
I find it strange to see how an extension of the scope of application of
the right to communication to the public could be, somehow, infringing on
international rights. I think, rather, we should be asking the question if this new
right that was created in Article 17 is even identical with the right of
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communication to the public that we have in the INFOSOC Directive, or
whether it isn't an entirely new regime.
LAURI RECHARDT: Thank you. Interesting as always. Let's move on.
Ursula, you want to have quick comments before we move on to DSA?
URSULA FEINDOR-SCHMIDT: I just wanted to respond to the new
regime. I think this was actually one idea that the German government tried but
actually withdrew, because we cannot find anything of this in the reasoning for
the Act anymore, and I think it would have brought too many problems how all
of this should play together. I think this thought was dropped, from my
perspective.
LAURI RECHARDT: I think that is correct. Let's leave a little bit for
the last general debate. Stan, over to you, and tell us what is great, and what is
not so great about the Commission proposal for the Digital Services Act. 48
STAN MCCOY: Thanks, Lauri. I'm very happy to do that. The first
thing that I need to say on this topic is that the views in this presentation do not
belong to Stan McCoy. I'm actually Stan's evil twin: My name is Dan McCrook.
I'm a cybercriminal, and I've hacked Stan's feed for purposes of this
presentation. I understand that Stan was going to give you some blah-blah-blah
happy talk about the EU's proposed Digital Services Act.
I'm sure he would have said “It's a good start, but it needs to be
strengthened in some respects…” blah blah blah. That guy is really boring.
I'm going to give you, instead, something I hope you'll find interesting:
a cybercriminal's guide to the DSA.
I have to say, when I first heard about this proposed EU Digital Services
Act, as a practicing cybercriminal, I was a little bit worried. A lot of the rhetoric
was talking about less exposure to illegal content, and about creating a level
playing field against providers of illegal content. I don't know what that means,
but providers of illegal content is me, so I'm concerned about that.
That came on top of some previous rhetoric from the European
Commission pushing platforms to tackle cybercrime, pointing out how
platforms need to step up their activities to prevent, detect, and remove illegal
content.
I was initially most concerned about some language in the DSA that
seems to encourage platforms to take voluntary measures against illegal content.
This language in Article 6 talks about intermediaries not being deemed
ineligible for liability exemptions solely because of their voluntary actions
against illegal content.
But then I realized it's actually nothing new. I went back to the 2017
Communication from the European Commission, where they actually said
exactly the same thing about pre-existing law: voluntary proactive measures
don't automatically lead to the online platform losing the liability exemption. In
truth, not much changes. Status quo is good, as far as I'm concerned, for
preserving the cybercrime business model.
Then I worried that the DSA due-diligence obligations could be a
problem. They might somehow oblige intermediaries to interfere with illegal
activities like mine. Digging into it, however, I actually see two good points in
48
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the text. The first good point: the liability exemptions are not conditioned on
compliance with these due diligence rules. It's not like you have to put in place
this trusted flagger or repeat infringer, et cetera, in order to protect your own
exposure to liability.
That means the platforms are likely to care a lot less about getting it right
if they're only exposing themselves to a regulatory violation by doing this, rather
than risking their own liability. That's good news for the cybercrime business
model, as far as I'm concerned.
The second good point relates to something that I think is really bad in
this Digital Services Act proposal, which is this idea of Know Your Business
Customer Requirements that seems to have crept in through Article 22. 49
I would say, in principle, this kind of Know Your Business Customer
Requirement would be the scourge of cybercrime in the DSA. This is really a
crazy idea: Carried to its logical extreme, everyone doing business on the
internet would have to say who they are. Even if you were out to do something
illegal, you'd have to reveal your actual identity, and you'd have the police, the
tax authorities, the child protection people, the IP rightsholders, all on your back
all the time. It'd be impossible to execute an illegal business model.
I'm very happy to report that this concept of Know Your Business
Customer, so far, is limited to e-commerce marketplaces only, which is a big
relief since that represents a very small percentage of the cybercrime business
model. No application to hosting providers, no application to advertising
providers. Really good news, as far as I'm concerned.
As I dug a little deeper into some more of the details, I found a couple
of more pieces of good news.
Really nice feature number one, no stay down. What a relief! Let me tell
you why. Cybercriminals already have low-cost technical tools to defeat notice
and action. If you do a Google search for anti-DMCA scripts, you'll find that
there are 12 million search results for these kinds of automatic re-upload
software. Here's one that restores your videos as soon as they get taken down, a
great little tool if you want to do something illegal.
At the end of the day, the DSA proposes process changes around notice
and action, but no real disruption of the cybercrime business model, and that’s
good news as far as I'm concerned as a practicing cyber-criminal.
A bonus feature about this notice and action stuff in the DSA is one of
the process changes requires an exact URL to get illegal content taken down,
but I increasingly do business through apps that are not even URL-based. That's
a nice little loophole for me.
Another thing I like in the DSA: it looks pretty difficult to kick a
platform out of the safe harbor because of illegal activity. If you examine this
language, it says that intermediaries lose access to the safe harbor if they
deliberately collaborate with service recipients to undertake illegal activities.
Well, good luck seeing inside the mind of the platform operator and
proving deliberate collaboration. This standard potentially means that platforms
can build features that objectively facilitate crime, but still claim their inner
thoughts don't include deliberate collaboration. Fortunately for us
49
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cybercriminals, the inner thoughts of our platform friends often revolve around
something else. I'm not going to say what, but I'll let you guess.
In summary, so far the DSA proposal, fortunately, doesn't live up to its
promise of curbing my illegal content business, because number one, this stuff
on voluntary measures is already the law. Number two, the due diligence
requirements are not tied to liability, and the worst of them, KYBC,50 is for
marketplaces only. Number three, there's no stay down requirement. Number
four, platforms can still access the liability exemptions because of that language
that I just pointed out on deliberate collaboration. This is all a big relief.
LAURI RECHARDT: Stan, we have lost Dan. Can you hear us?
STAN MCCOY: Sorry. Did you lose the end of my presentation there?
I seemed to have a little quirk.
LAURI RECHARDT: Yes, only the very end. I think we got the gist,
and first of all, big thanks and convey our best regards to Dan, a great
presentation, and now, if we can get Stan back for a while.
STAN MCCOY: Yes.
LAURI RECHARDT: Is there anything good in the DSA?
STAN MCCOY: Yes. As my evil twin brother previewed, Stan's view
is actually that this legislation is a step in the right direction. They just haven't
gone far enough on some of these points where they had an opportunity to take
action against illegal content in a much more meaningful way. Stay down is a
great illustration of that. As the 512 report bore out, and as many rightsholders
have experienced, notice and takedown is broken. It just doesn't deliver the
benefit it was meant to deliver. Here, the Commission had an opportunity to
really improve the system in a way that it would have curbed illegal content.
The process changes they've laid on the table just won't do that.
LAURI RECHARDT: Thanks. I think we have a couple of minutes left,
so a couple of questions from Q&As, and I think this one goes first to Maria,
right? The use of algorithms to customize content to add more revenue seems
inconsistent with the safe harbor originally intended for passive platforms,
should there be a different regime for this?
MARIA STRONG: On the U.S. side of things, obviously algorithms are
being used. I think Abby and Julia have also mentioned, as other stakeholders
have, in the sense that—the concern is that algorithms can't make decisions on
fair use, which is part of some of the decisions, especially coming out of the
Lenz case.51 I think that is a factor for discussion with the legislator. I don't see
exactly how that's going to be the end-all-be-all in the system as currently
established here in the States at all.
I think to the extent we can begin further exploration with respect to
what kind of processes might be used to support STMs,52 but that's a different
question. Algorithms can play a different role to support as a tool, but perhaps
not as the ultimate decider at various parts of the current notice and takedown
system. But we need more congressional guidance, we need a lot more
information and a lot more pieces to pull things together, because I think as
we've seen in Europe, there are a lot of different pieces, and putting them all
together in a cohesive whole is a really huge challenge.
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LAURI RECHARDT: Just very quick question from my side, would you
say that a service that only uses algorithms to organize, promote, optimize the
presentation of the content is automatically eligible for safe harbor for that
reason only?
MARIA STRONG: No, I don't think you can make any such blanket
statement. I think that goes back to the concerns that we've mentioned in our
report, and I think Sandra mentioned earlier as well, that goes to the heart of the
red flag knowledge question. That goes exactly to the core of the current system.
What is actual? What is red flag? It's a case-by-case circumstance. We think the
courts have veered and it needs to be re-evaluated by the legislator. I don't think
you can make a blanket statement like that, Lauri, but thank you.
LAURI RECHARDT: Thanks. Okay. The last question in the Q&As.
On how many levels did the German implementation of Article 17 shift value
from exclusive rights into collective management? Ursula, Julia, if you want to
take that, or both of you.
JULIA REDA: Yes. The German implementation actually emphasizes
collective management quite a lot, and I think part of that is that all the critics
of Article 17 that said that upload filters would lead to the deletion of legal
content were told over the entire legislative process that this would not happen
because everything would be licensed, but of course, in order to make sure that
everything is actually licensed, you have to have some degree of mandatory
collective management.
This is the tension that we're seeing here, that we have certain parts of
the entertainment industry that are quite happy with collective management
arrangement, and I think to some extent, they were also instrumental in lobbying
for Article 17 in the first place, but then Article 17 does not distinguish between
different types of content and different business models.
Now, we have the problem that other parts of the entertainment industry
are actually extremely uncomfortable with this approach of collective
management, and I think this was sort of a crucial mistake in the design of
Article 17 from the beginning that it was trying to create a system that was based
pretty much on the fight between the German collecting society for music rights
holders and YouTube, and trying to extrapolate from this one legal dispute and
create a rule that applies to all sorts of parts of the entertainment industry, and
in fact, all sorts of platforms where this approach may not be the correct way.
URSULA FEINDOR-SCHMIDT: As I said, just to follow up on this, it
also, of course, discriminates against smaller rightsholders because of the
obligation to approach a rightsholder, and to ask for a license is only true in the
German draft act for representative rightsholders. There is no definition of what
a representative rightsholder should be, is this a larger film producer, is it a
larger music label, or is it a collecting society? It's probably not, but still, it
seems like the larger rightsholders will be able to control their rights, whereas
smaller rightsholders won't be because they are not representative.
SANDRA AISTARS: Can I jump in here on this as well, Lauri? I think
this seems to be a problem across the board with respect to small rightsholders,
and Abigail spoke very eloquently about the challenges that startups face, and
individual artists and small businesses seem to be ignored far more frequently
than startups are, in terms of how they are treated in these sorts of negotiations,
whether they are invited to the table to participate in dialogue, whether they are
given effective remedies at all.
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This is true, even in business to business discussions, where, as a matter
of course, individual artists and small businesses in the arts are almost never
given access to things like ContentGuard and other tools that would allow them
to manage their rights on platforms such as YouTube and other platforms where
their works are consistently infringed, and to some degree, if individual
rightsholders had access to these automated tools and the control to decide
whether their works are allowed to stay up and be monetized perhaps they
wouldn't be taken down so frequently, perhaps you'd be sharing revenue with
these individual rightsholders and small businesses, rather than dealing with
notice and stay down debates with them as you are.
I think that's something that is worth considering as you think about
these issues. The other thing that Abigail mentioned when she was speaking
about the challenges that startups face, is this challenge of huge liability in the
investments that startups make, and individual rightsholders make those same
investments, although they don't have the same kind of venture capitalists and
angel funders backing them.
Instead, they're typically zeroing out their retirement funds, if they even
have a retirement fund, or maxing out multiple credit cards, or going to their
parents or their friends for investments and they can do that only once. Once
you have tapped those individual resources they are gone, you're never going to
make another film again with those sorts of resources.
You can’t just close up shop and say, "Hey, I learned from that failure.
Now, I'm going to go launch my next startup." So, you've lost that artist, you've
lost that voice, and that's a loss for all of us in the greater community—in the
arts ecosystem. We owe it to ourselves as audiences and allies of artists to find
ways to solve the sorts of issues that Abigail was raising not only for startups in
the tech community but for individuals and small businesses in the arts as well.
LAURI RECHARDT: Thanks, Sandra. I believe that we are at the end
of this session. It is a pity we can't continue, but time is up. Anyways, what I'd
like to say is that we probably didn't quite reach a consensus as to the sweet
spot, where we ought to strike the right balance between the different
fundamental rights, but hopefully, we got a fair airing of the different views.
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